Explorations of the impact of "sticky" local information on the locus of innovation : a progress review by Hippel, Eric von. & Sloan School of Management.
Explorations of the Impact of
"Sticky" Local Information on the
Locus of Innovation: A Progress Review
Eric von Hippel
Evhippel@mit.edu
SWP # 4019 April, 1998
1
Explorations of the Impact of "Sticky" Local Information
on the Locus of Innovation: A Progress Report
ABSTRACT
In this article we briefly summarize our work to date on the impact of sticky
information on the locus of innovation. First, initial empirical work has shown a link
between information stickiness and the locus of innovation-related problem-solving.
Second, a pattern of iterative shiftings has been shown in the locus of problem-solving
work that appears to be related to problem-solvers' needs for access to sticky information
located at two or more sites. Third, we have proposed that such iterative shiftings can be
reduced by repartitioning an overall innovation task into subtasks that can each be
performed at a single site containing sticky information, and have seen movement
towards such a pattern in two industries studied to date. Forth, we propose that the
economics of sticky information, combined with advances in computerization, are
leading to an increasingly common pattern of innovation task partitioning in which users
are "empowered" to customize products and services for themselves at user sites.
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1. Introduction
In the early 1990's my students and I began a program to explore the impact of
"sticky" local information on the locus of innovation. We were first led to this subject by
the response of some innovating users to a question we had asked in a series of
interviews: "Why did you decide to develop X innovation yourself rather than asking a
manufacturer to do it for you?" In addition to the expected responses regarding economic
incentives, there was a very interesting additional element present. A number of
interviewees volunteered that they had decided to develop their innovation themselves
because they felt it would be very difficult to accurately tell a manufacturer what they
wanted.
Interviewees reported that, in part, this anticipated difficulty was due to the fact
that their need for the innovation in question did not pre-exist the innovation itself in a
stable form: that is, their need and the ultimate solution to it (their innovation) were in
fact being co-evolved during the problem-solving work that ultimately resulted in the
innovation. An additional source of difficulty was that their need-related information
was for various reasons not easy to transfer to the manufacturer: "Even when we know
what we want, it is not easy to describe our needs accurately and completely." We found
both of these points very interesting, and have begun to explore both. Our explorations
of"sticky" information are addressed to the second issue raised by the interviewees, and
a progress report on this matter is the topic of this present paper.
2. Information is often sticky
Our explorations of sticky information began with a review of the arguments and
findings of the many researchers who have explored information transfer costs. In
general, these researchers found that information was indeed often costly to transfer from
place to place. Several non-exclusive explanations have been advanced for this
phenomenon. Thus, Polanyi pointed out that much information associated with human
skill and expertise is "tacit." That is, "the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the
observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following them"
(Polanyi 1958, 49, italicized in original). And, "an art which cannot be specified in detail
cannot be transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can be passed
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on only by example from master to apprentice..." - a relatively costly mode of transfer
(ibid., 52,53). Nelson pointed out that technological knowledge is "partly a private good
and partly a public one" (1990,1), that is: (1) "a set of specific designs and practices," and
(2) "a body of generic knowledge that surrounds these and provides understanding of
how things work..."(1990,8). The former is often relatively costly to learn about and to
use (1980,1981); often developed in the interaction of R&D and other functions in the
firm (Nelson and Winter 1982); and thus private to its creators, "at least when new"
(1990,13). Rosenberg emphasizes that while theoretical knowledge derived from
science has a role in technical advance and can be diffused at low cost, much
technological knowledge is costly, difficult, and slow to diffuse since it deals with "the
specific and the particular" (1976,78); takes place in "innumerable small
increments..."(ibid.); is tacit and sometimes "even resists formalized statement or
codification (ibid.).
In addition, several scholars pointed out that recipients of transferred information
must often incur additional costs in order to use it - which, if one regards information as
not being really transferred until it is usable, can be viewed as part of information transfer
costs as well. Thus, Pavitt observes that "there are very few free technological lunches.
Even borrowers of technology must have their own skills, and make their own
expenditures on development and production engineering; they cannot treat technology
developed elsewhere as a free, or even very cheap, good" (1987,186). Similarly,
Evenson and Kislev observe with respect to the economic impact of scientific research on
agricultural productivity that "little knowledge is borrowed if no indigenous research
takes place" (1973,1314). And Cohen and Levinthal argue that a firm's absorptive
capacity with respect to new, external information is largely a function of the firm's prior
related knowledge. "At the most elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic
skills or even a shared language but may also include knowledge of the most recent
scientific or technological developments in a given field"(1990,128).
3. Sticky information and the locus of innovation
It seemed to us, given the comments of interviewees noted earlier, that it would be
useful to explore the impact of information transfer costs on the locus of innovation. To
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obtain a direct and uncomplicated focus on this issue, we decided to explore the impact of
information transfer costs independent of the reason for those costs. Accordingly, we
defined the "stickiness" of a given unit of information in a given instance as simply the
incremental expenditure required to transfer that unit of information to a specified locus
in a form usable by a given information seeker - independent of cause. (Thus, whether it
was found to cost $100,000 to transfer a given unit of information to the information
seeker because of encoding issues, and/or because of absorbtive capacity issues and/or
because an information holder demanded $100,000 to grant a license to use that unit of
information (which could otherwise be costlessly transferred), the stickiness of that unit
of information is the same from the point of view of our definition of the term.)
Our basic hypothesis regarding the impact of sticky information on the locus of
innovation is a simple one: When information transfer costs are a significant component
of the costs of innovation-related problem-solving work, there will be a tendency to carry
out that work at the locus of sticky information, other things being equal. (Analogous
arguments are commonly made with respect to materials transportation costs in the case
of factory location. E.g., it is reasonable that a firm locate its materials-processing
factory at a site that will minimize total input and output transportation costs, other things
being equal.)
We reasoned that this general hypothesis could be applied to the locus of
innovation-related problem-solving involved in the development of a new product or
service - innovation user versus the innovation manufacturer. It seemed applicable to
this setting, because in product and service development two information bases located -
at least initially - in physically different places are typically important for successful
problem-solving. The first is information on need, located initially with the user. The
second is information on solution technologies, often located initially at the site of
manufacturers specializing in those technologies. In this case, then, the general
hypothesis became: all else being equal, if need information required for a specific
innovation is "stickier" than required solution information, we should see an increase in
the amount of innovation-related problem-solving that is carried out at the site of the
user. Conversely, if solution information is stickier than required need information, we
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should see an increase in the amount of innovation-related problem-solving that is carried
out at the site of the manufacturer.
Recently the first empirical test of this idea was carried out by Susumu Ogawa
(1998), with findings that were strongly in support of the hypothesis. Ogawa's
innovation sample was 24 equipment innovations produced by NEC, a Japanese
equipment maker, for Seven-Eleven Japan (SEJ), a major Japanese convenience store
chain. These innovations implemented improvements to SEJ store inventory
management practices, and were developed and installed in SEJ stores between 1978 and
1992. Ogawa developed proxies based on information novelty for the stickiness of major
elements of the need and technology information required to develop the innovations in
his sample. He also argued that his findings were relatively independent of user and
manufacturer expectations regarding the Appropriability of innovation-related benefits,
due to the effect of an agreement between NEC and SEJ that covered the entire series of
innovations.2
Ogawa determined that increases in need related information stickiness were
significantly correlated with increasing amounts of innovation-related problem-solving
being carried out by the user. (Kendall correlation coefficients = .5784, P< .01). He also
Ogawa measured the stickiness of need information that would be required by a
manufacturer-based problem solver to develop the innovation in question in terms of the
number of user inventory management "activities" affected by an innovation that were
not already previously known to the manufacturer. (By "previously known," he meant
"the same activity was already delivered to SEJ by an equipment produced by NEC.")
He measured the stickiness of technology information that must be transferred to the user
in order for the user to specify the technical means to implement the innovation in terms
of the number of "component technologies" affected by the innovation that were not
already previously known to the user. (By "component technologies," he meant
"technology (e.g. LCD display) that can be relatively independently developed as one
part of the whole product." By previously known," he meant "previously used by SEJ in
a store inventory management application.")
2 .Ogawa reports that NEC and SEJ had an agreement that applied to all innovations in
the sample. In that agreement, NEC agreed to sell innovations developed with SEJ only
to SEJ for two years - about the length of time that either side might expect to be able to
garner monopoly rents from the innovations. This arrangement held independent of the
relative level of each firm's contribution to the innovation development work in any
particular case.
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found that stickier technology-related information was associated with increasing
amounts of the technology-related problem-solving being done by the manufacturer
(Kendall correlation coefficients = -. 4789, P < .05).
4. Iterative shifts in the locus of problem-solving
A second proposal regarding the impact of information stickiness on the locus of
innovation-related problem-solving was that, when the solving of a given problem
requires access to sticky information located at two or more sites, problem-solving
activity will be observed to move iteratively among those sites. This proposal was based
on the finding of others that problem-solving in general (Baron 1988, PP 43-47) and
technical problem-solving in particular (Allen 1966, Clark and Fujimoto 1991,
Hauschildt 1986, Iansiti 1997, Marples 1961, Smith and Eppinger 1997, Wheelwright
and Clark 1992, Thomke 1997)) has trial and error as a prominent feature. If and as each
cycle of a trial and error process requires access to sticky information located at more
than one site, it seemed reasonable that iterative shiftings of problem-solving activity
among sticky information sites would occur as problem-solving proceeded.
To get insight into this pattern, my colleague Marcie Tyre and explored the
innovation-related problem solving involved in identifying and diagnosing 27 field
failures in process equipment used to automatically assemble complex circuit boards (von
Hippel and Tyre 1995). We documented repeated shifts in the locus of technical
problem-solving activity occurring during this work, with the number of shifts found
ranging from 0 to 7, and averaging about 2.3 times per problem identified and diagnosed
(Figure 1). These shifts involved engineers traveling back and forth between development
lab and plant (two to three hours by car), carrying out technical problem-solving activities
at each site, and carrying intermediate findings back and forth in their minds and/or
computer data disks. For example, to begin the diagnosis of a machine that was failing in
the field, the designers of that particular machine would often visit the plant where it was
being used in order to observe the malfunction in context and run diagnostic tests. Then
they would return to the development lab (the site of specialized lab equipment, relevant
expertise, and other types of information) to examine the test results and continue their
diagnostic work. Often this work would lead to the need for a second trip to the field for
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more data collection, and so forth. Exploration of the motivations for each such shift to a
different site showed that, more than 80% of the time, the motivation had to do with
getting access to "situated" information located at that site (Tyre and von Hippel 1997).
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The likely ubiquity of iterative shiftings of the locus of problem-solving during
product and service development is suggested by the emergence of product development
procedures specifically designed to implement such a pattern. For example "rapid
prototyping" is a method of software development explicitly designed to shuttle
repeatedly between manufacturer and users. A number of individual case studies and
experiments have shown that rapid prototyping methods are not only less costly than
traditional, noniterative methods but are able to "better satisfy true user requirements and
produce information and functionality that is more complete, more accurate, and more
meaningful" (Connell and Shafer 1989, 15; Boehm, Gray, and Seewaldt 1984; Gomaa
1983).
5. Sticky Information and "Task Partitioning"
The observation that sticky information considerations would often lead to a
pattern of problem-solving that involved iteration among two or more problem-solving
sites led us to explore whether there could not be some alternative to this pattern. After
all, as is common experience, iteration can be very costly with respect to time and effort.
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Thus, no patient likes the shuffling back and forth and time lags involved when a medical
condition involves even routine diagnostic tests by and coordinated problem solving
among several physicians in different specialties. And, similarly, no designer likes the
cost in time and money and frustration involved in repeated redesign of a finished
product or service as a result of new information uncovered as a result of test marketing
conducted at user sites.
Our search for an alternative to iteration led us to propose that, when the
information transfer costs of iteration are high, innovators may find it advantageous to
partition innovation-related problem-solving activities that require access to multiple loci
of sticky information into subproblems that each draw on only one such locus of sticky
information. In the specific context of product and service design, we reasoned that the
overall design problem would be partitioned into (1) an application-specific portion that
drew upon user-based sticky information for solution and would be solved by users and,
(2) into a general solution plus customization tools portion that would be developed by
manufacturers.
Our first empirical exploration of this possibility addressed the evolution of the
partitioning of product and service customization work between users and manufacturers
in two fields: Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Computer-Telephony
Integration (CTI) (von Hippel 1998). In both cases, we did find a task "repartioning"
taking place that did in fact convert the overall task of creating custom products into a
user sub-problem and a manufacturer sub-problem, each of which could be solved by
drawing largely upon sticky local data residing at each of these two sites.
As illustration, we will briefly outline how custom integrated circuit development
has been repartitioned between users and manufacturers as a result of a transition from
traditional methods of designing custom circuits to the current ASIC design and
manufacturing process. In the design of custom integrated circuits, two sticky data bases
are central to the problem-solving work: (1) information at the circuit user locus
involving a rich and complex understanding of both the overall application in which the
custom integrated circuit will play a role and the specific function required of that circuit;
(2) information at the circuit manufacturer locus involving a rich and complex
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understanding of the constraints and possibilities of the silicon fabrication process that
the manufacturer uses to produce integrated circuits.
Traditionally, custom integrated circuits were developed in an iterative process
between a circuit user possessing sticky need information and an integrated circuit
manufacturer possessing sticky information about designing and producing silicon
integrated circuits. The process would begin with a user specifying the functions that the
custom chip was to perform to a circuit design specialist employed by the integrated
circuit manufacturer. The chip would then be designed at the manufacturer locus, and an
(expensive) prototype would be produced and sent to the user. Testing by the user would
typically reveal faults in the chip and/or the initial specification, responsive changes
would be made, a new prototype built, and so forth.
More recently, the Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) method of
making custom integrated circuits has come into wide practice. In the ASIC method, the
overall problem of designing custom circuits is partitioned into subproblems which each
draw on only one locus of sticky information, thereby eliminating the need to iterate
between two such sites in the design process. The manufacturer of ASICs draws on its
own sticky information to develop and improve the fabrication processes in its
manufacturing plant, a "silicon foundry." The manufacturer also draws on its own sticky
information to design "standard" silicon wafers that contain an array of unconnected
circuit elements such as logic gates. These standard circuit elements arrays are designed
by the manufacturer to be interconnectable into working integrated circuits by the later
addition of custom interconnection layers designed in accordance with the needs of
specific users.
The interconnection design task is then partitioned from the device design task
and is taken on by users. To facilitate this user design task, the manufacturer provides
custom circuit users with a user-friendly Computer-Aided Design (CAD) software
package that enables them to design a custom interconnection layer design to meet their
specific application needs and yet stay within the production capabilities of the
manufacturer's silicon foundry. This CAD software also allows the user to simulate the
function of the custom circuit under design, and to conduct trial-and-error experiments.
Taken together, these capabilities allow the user to both design a circuit, and to refine
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need specifications and the desired circuit function through an iterative process that
draws only on sticky information located at the user site. In sum, by partitioning the
overall circuit design task into user-based and manufacturer based subtasks, the ASIC
method of designing custom integrated circuits reduces the need for the iterative shifting
of the locus of innovation-related problem solving between user and manufacturer.
6. Summary and Discussion
Work to date has shown a link between information stickiness and the locus of
innovation-related problem-solving. A pattern of iterative shiftings of problem-solving
work has also been documented, with a possible explanation being problem-solvers'
iterative needs for access to sticky information located at two or more sites. Finally, an
argument has been made that this need for iteration may be reduced by "partitioning"
innovation-related tasks drawing upon multiple sites of sticky information into two or
more subproblems, each drawing primarily upon a single site of sticky information. A
case study has documented such a pattern in two fields.
We now conclude this progress report by proposing that many fields are evolving
or will evolve towards a pattern in which application-specific design of product and
services will be partitioned from the more general tasks of product and service
development, and will increasingly be transferred to users when: (1) the supplier faces
heterogeneous demand for a given type of product or service (that is, many of the users
served place a high value on custom solutions); (2) agency costs experienced by users
who outsource design activities are high; (3) the stickiness of application-specific user
information is high; and (4) the stickiness of information held by suppliers that is relevant
to application-specific problem-solving is low (von Hippel 1998).
We elaborate on this point by first noting that that the stickiness of a given body
of information is not immutable. Thus, when the costs of iteration are considered to be
high, efforts will sometimes be directed toward investing in "unsticking" or reducing the
stickiness of some of the information. For example, firms may reduce the stickiness of a
critical form of technical expertise by investing in converting some of that expertise from
tacit knowledge to the more explicit and easily transferable form of a software "expert
system"(Davis 1986). Or they may invest in reducing the stickiness of information of
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interest to users by converting it into a remotely accessible and user-friendly computer
data base. This is what the travel industry did, for example, when it invested substantial
sums to put its various data bases for airline schedules, hotel reservations, and car rentals
"on-line" in a user-accessible form.
An investment in unsticking a unit of information is a one-time investment that reduces
the marginal cost of all succeeding transfers of that information. Therefore, the incentive to
invest in reducing the stickiness of a given unit of information will vary according to the number
of times that one expects to transfer it. As illustration, suppose that to solve a particular problem,
two units of equally sticky local information are required, one from a user and one from a
supplier. In that case, there will be an equal incentive operating to unstick either of these units of
information in order to reduce the cost of transfer, other things (such as the cost of unsticking)
being equal. But now suppose that there is reason to expect that one of the units of information,
say the supplier's, will be a candidate for transfer n times in the future, while the user's unit of
information will be of interest to problem solvers only once. For example, suppose that a
supplier expects to have the same technical information called on repeatedly to solve n user
product application problems, and that each such problem involves unique user information. In
that case, the total incentive to unstick the supplier's information across the entire series of user
problems is n times higher than the incentive for an individual user to unstick its problem-related
information.
In the case of the problem-solving work of product and service development, the situation
just described is the one often encountered in the real world. Manufacturers do tend to specialize
in a given solution type, which they attempt to apply to the diverse application problems of many
users. Also, the local information required from a supplier to solve each novel application
problem tends to be the same, while the local information required from the user tends to be
novel or have novel components. Under such conditions, and for the reasons just described, we
expect that sticky information transfer cost considerations will create an incentive to shift the
locus of problem-solving activity to the locus of the less frequently called-upon information - in
the case of our example, to the user. (As illustration, recall the shift from the traditional iterative
method of designing custom integrated circuits to the ASIC task partitioning method that we
described earlier. During the problem-solving work of circuit design, each circuit designer
requires access to the same information about the constraints of the circuit manufacturing
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process, but requires different information about the specific application being designed for. As a
consequence, the ASIC manufacturer found it economic to unstick the repeatedly called-upon
production process information by investing in encoding it in a user-friendly CAD package. And,
as a further consequence, the problem-solving activity of custom circuit design was shifted to the
locus of sticky information regarding each unique application - the user.)
We propose that user-based design is becoming and will become an increasingly
attractive option in many fields due to advances in computerization. More specifically,
improvements in computer hardware and software are allowing "unstuck" supplier information to
be shifted to users in increasingly user-friendly and more capable ways. Consider, for example,
that it has always been possible for a integrated circuit manufacturer to unstick key process
information and transfer it to user-based designers. In earlier days, however, that information
would have been unstuck by encoding it in a process specification sheet or booklet, and it would
have been up to the user-designer to know when a particular bit of information was relevant to
his or her design, find the booklet and look it up. Today, process information can be embedded
in a computerized design tool, which can be programmed to offer the user items of process
information only if and as the design being worked upon makes them relevant. For example, a
simulation tool can be programmed to tell a designer that "your design is getting too big to
process on a single chip" only if and as the user is approaching that particular limit to the
available solution space. More generally, the ability to encode unstuck problem-solving expertise
in user-relevant language may not have changed over time, but the ability to offer this translated
information conveniently and appropriately connected to the design work itself certainly has been
greatly improved as a result of technological advance.
We hope that this brief progress report will stimulate the reader to think about
joining in on the research regarding information stickiness and the locus of innovation.
Our own work during these past few years has only been able to sketch out some
interesting linkages between sticky information and the locus of innovation via theory-
building and case studies. We think that a great deal more interesting work remains to be
done before this area can be considered to be well explored. Among the interesting
issues still to be considered: explorations of patterns of information stickiness may enable
us to understand more about patterns of specialization among firms. Since an
organizational boundary can add to the cost of information transfer, it seems likely that
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firms seeking to economize with respect to the transfer of sticky information will seek to
align their organizational boundaries - and their specializations - with the partitionings
dictated by the types of innovation-related problem-solving tasks that are important to
them. For similar reasons, consideration of the impact of sticky information may be
useful in studying the various collaborative innovation patterns that are being practiced
by firms today (e.g., Gemunden 1980). We also propose that studies of sticky
information can increase our understanding of how firms protect, sell, trade, diffuse, and
appropriate benefit from information. Thus, stickiness can help the possessors of
valuable information to prevent unintentional diffusion to competitors, but that same
property may make it more costly to diffuse the information intentionally.
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